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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issue of foreign exchange and capital controls in the 
context of the Southern African Development Community’s goal of regional 
integration. It reviews the theory and evidence surrounding current and capital 
account liberalisation and argues that there is a lack of sufficiently refined de jure 
measures of capital account openness. A new index for measuring exchange 
control restrictiveness is created based on data from the International Monetary 
Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER) for the 15 SADC member states. It identifies substantial variation in the 
exchange control regulations across SADC countries that other existing, more 
indices fail to account for. The new index illustrates the considerable range of 
variation of exchange restrictiveness within SADC, as well as illustrating SADC’s 
relative exchange restrictiveness compared with other countries, inside and outside 
of Africa. The new index also correlates with several measures of financial 
development, certain balance of payment items, and some measures of 
institutional development, which makes it a useful measure for SADC integration. 
The paper highlights the challenges for SADC monetary union in the sphere of 
exchange control. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial integration has been intensifying across the world over the past three decades 
(Binici, Hutchinson & Schindler, 2010: 666). This can be seen in the lower levels of regulation 
on foreign exchange transactions, less restricted flows of capital and higher volumes of 
cross-border asset holdings (Prati, Schindler & Valenzuela, 2009: 3). While substantial 
evidence exists showing that free trade and low tariffs for goods are favourable for growth 
and development, there is a lack consensus on the benefits of free trade in services and 
capital. Most countries have liberalised current account transactions and the focus is now 
shifting to the debate surrounding capital account liberalisation.  
The motivation for this paper is two-fold: 1) In the context of increasing Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) regional integration, consistent controls across member 
countries of the regional block are important and thus an exchange control index of 
restrictiveness is created and presented here as a measurement tool to help assess SADC 
progress toward regional integration. 2) The creation of an exchange rate restrictiveness 
index provides a mechanism to revisit the relationship between exchange controls and 
macroeconomic performance in a more scientific manner. 
Capital account liberalisation is generally on the rise but the associated benefits and risks of 
international financial integration are still heavily contested, as is the efficacy of capital and 
exchange controls. Despite this, capital account restrictions and exchange controls are still 
widely used policy tools in monitoring and regulating international financial transactions. In 
the context of developing nations, the efficacy of exchange controls is an especially 
important debate as questionable macroeconomic stability, implementation capacity, 
financial sector depth and a susceptibility to domestic and international financial shocks 
create a potentially precarious economic environment. 
The SADC has shown particular interest in this issue as one of its goals for the 15 member 
state block is to form a monetary union with a common currency and a regional central 
bank by 2018 (SADC Secretariat, 2003a). Evaluating the costs and benefits of exchange 
controls, as well as the desirability of increased financial integration, is therefore clearly 
important. While many studies have looked at these subjects, there are limited robust 
empirical answers available. As Prati et al (2009: 3) identify, among “the many possible 
reasons for the lack of stronger results, two factors are likely to be important: the use of 
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aggregated data in many studies, and the lack of sufficiently refined de jure measures of 
capital account openness.”  
In order to facilitate examination of the feasibility of SADC regional integration and assess 
the potential for capital account harmonisation, this paper aims to address the mentioned 
deficit by creating a new index capturing the exchange control restrictiveness of SADC 
member states. The index is based on data from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and includes 
scores for sub-categories that reflect the major components affecting the openness of a 
country’s current and capital external account transactions. It is designed to capture the 
substantial variation in the regulation and effects of capital and exchange controls across 
the countries that other existing, more aggregated capital control indices fail to account for. 
Section 2 looks briefly at SADC regional integration to provide the context of the study. 
Section 3 reviews the literature on exchange and capital controls, going into definitions, 
measurement, history and trends as well as the costs and benefits of liberalisation and the 
related empirical evidence. Section 4 presents the new restrictiveness index – its 
construction, relevance, strengths and limitations, correlation with other existing indices 
and some observations. Section 5 explores the correlation of the new index with a number 
of macroeconomic variables and political economy measures and discusses the results. 
Section 6 looks at some policy implications and concludes. 
2. The Goal of SADC Regional Integration 
Over the last three decades, a resurgence of interest in regional integration has been 
witnessed (Gibb, 1998: 295). The African Union (AU), seeing monetary unification as a 
symbol of strength and political solidarity as well as a way of perfecting a single market and 
stimulating economic development1, has shown interest in creating a pan-African monetary 
union (MU) (Tavlas, 2008: 5). As a way of working towards this end, the AU is encouraging 
each of the continent’s regional blocks to look into the viability of full regional integration. 
SADC has adopted this goal and aims to create a MU by 2018. The idea was first captured by 
the SADC Treaty in Articles 212 and 223 as well as in the Finance and Development Protocol 
(FIP) in 1992 and 1996 respectively. 
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SADC’s road to a MU is outlined in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP4), the 15-year regional integration framework based on SADC’s vision, mission, 
common agenda and principles that provides strategic direction for achieving SADC’s long-
term social and economic goals (SADC Secretariat, 2003b). The SADC recognised that the 
transition to a full MU would need to be gradual and set five key milestones to mark its 
transition (Table 2.1). While some progress has been made5, the RISDP started late due to 
human resources’ constraints. The Member States’ implementation is also currently behind 
schedule as the majority of member states did not possess, or set aside, the necessary 
capacity to coordinate and implement the RISDP programmes at the national level (SADC 
Secretariat, 2010). For example, the free trade area targets have only been achieved in 
2012. 
Analysing SADC member states’ current foreign exchange and capital restrictions is an 
important element of this transition process. Before a common market can be formed with 
free movement of factors of production, there needs to be capital account liberalisation 
between the SADC countries so that capital can flow freely within the region. In order to 
achieve a full MU, all member states need to be internally liberalised. While external 
liberalisation is not a requirement, each member state would need to make sure their 
policies were harmonised in regards to other member states’ policies. This condition would 
also need to hold for the member states’ respective currencies to be at a fixed convertible 
rate and for monetary policy to be coordinated across the SADC region. The creation of an 
exchange control restrictiveness index helps facilitate the necessary analysis of member 
states’ current position and subsequent progress towards regional integration. 
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3. Exchange Controls: Theory and Evidence 
Exchange controls are presented below as non-tariff barriers that act somewhat like a quota 
restriction. Their nature must be understood to confront the challenge of harmonizing or 
removing them. The role of exchange controls is discussed in terms of their impact on 
monetary policy, the current account balance and the capital account flows. 
3.1 Definitions and Measurement 
Current and capital account restrictions may include: 1) quantitative restriction of payments 
for balance of payments transactions; 2) reporting requirements; 3) timing requirements; 
and 4) permission (or license) requirements.  
There are three key characteristics common to most controls: 1) they are linked to a specific 
line item within the BoP, 2) they distinguish the type of transactor, usually residents or non-
residents, but also individual, company or financial institution, and 3) they take into account 
the direction of flows “in” or “out” of the country.  
Table 3.1 shows a breakdown of exchange and capital transactions that are typically subject 
to controls. The examples are based on the AREAER.6 The AREAER is a unique database 
published by the IMF tracking exchange and trade arrangements for all 187 member 
countries since 1950 (IMF, 2010)7.  
Table 2.1. 5-Stage Transition Framework to a Full Monetary Union for the SADC 
1 Free Trade Area FTA Absence of tariffs on intra-SADC trade 2008 
2 Customs Union CU 
Common tariffs on imports from non-member  
states 
2010 
3 Common Market CM 
CU with free movements of factors of  
production 
2015 
4 
Incomplete Monetary  
Union 
IMU 
Irrevocably fixed exchange rates and  
coordination of monetary policy 
2016 
5 Full Monetary Union MU Single currency and one regional central bank 2018 
Source:  RISDP (SADC, 2003a) and Tavlas (2008). 
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Table 3.1. Types of Exchange and Capital Transactions Possibly Subject to Controls 
Foreign exchange budget Repatriation & surrender requirements 
   Surrender to central bank 
   Surrender to authorised dealers 
   Minimum financing requirements    Minimum financing requirements 
   Advance payment requirements    Advance payment requirements 
   Advance import deposits    Advance export deposits 
   For release of foreign exchange for imports 
   Domiciliation, preshipment inspection,     Domiciliation, preshipment inspection,  
     letters of credit     guarantess, letters of credit 
Import licenses and other non-tariff measures Export licenses with & without quotas 
Collected through exchange system Collected through exchange system 
Trade Payments and Proceeds 
IMPORTS EXPORTS 
Financing requirements 
Documentation requirements 
Licenses 
Taxes and/or tariffs 
Goods 
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Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
Table 3.1. Continued 
Shares or other securities of a participating nature 
   Purchase locally by nonresidents    Sale or issue locally by nonresidents 
   Sale or issue abroad by residents    Purchase abroad by residents 
Bonds or other debt securities 
   Purchase locally by nonresidents    Sale or issue locally by nonresidents 
   Sale or issue abroad by residents    Purchase abroad by residents 
Money market instruments 
   Purchase locally by nonresidents Sale or issue locally by nonresidents 
   Sale or issue abroad by residents Purchase abroad by residents 
Collective investment securities 
   Purchase locally by nonresidents Sale or issue locally by nonresidents 
   Sale or issue abroad by residents Purchase abroad by residents 
Inward direct investment Outward direct investment 
Controls on liquidation of direct investment 
To residents from nonresidents By residents to nonresidents 
   Held domestically    Held domestically 
   Held abroad 
   Account in domestic currency held abroad    Domestic currency accounts held locally 
    Convertible into foreign currency?    Convertible into foreign currency? 
Residency 
RESIDENTS NON-RESIDENTS 
Foreign exchange account permitted? 
Domestic currency accounts 
Capital and Money Markets 
Direct Investment 
Personal capital movements: deposits, loans, gifts, endowments and inheritences 
Capital Transactions 
INFLOWS OUTFLOWS 
8 
 
There are many subtle overlaps and interactions between exchange controls, trade 
restrictions, capital controls and prudential measures. For our purposes, exchange controls 
will relate to restrictions connected with cross-border payments and cover all elements of 
Table 3.1. Thus exchange controls do not directly restrict trade but effectively act as 
generalised non-tariff trade barriers, more like a quota than a tariff. We refer to exchange 
controls in general, which may affect both the current and capital accounts, whereas capital 
controls restrict capital transactions only. Prudential measures, on the other hand, involve 
the discretionary use of instruments and regulations designed specifically to protect the 
financial system and macro-economy of a country (Korinek, 2011). Some exchange controls 
can be prudential measures.  
When trying to measure the relationship between capital account liberalization and 
international financial integration, there is a debate as to whether the best indicators are de 
facto or de jure measures. De jure or rule based measures reflect the existence of 
regulations but fail to address how effective they are at attracting or deterring transactions 
in practice through successful enforcement. De facto measures, on the other hand, capture 
the actual capital flows but say little about the policies or desires of the country. Some 
countries, especially advanced economies, have managed to obtain high levels of financial 
integration in terms of both measures whereas others show very different results 
depending on whether the measure uses de facto or de jure data (Prasad et al, 2003: 6). The 
relationship between the two measures for a country can provide some interesting insights 
on the efficacy of its controls (Edison, Klein, Ricci & Sløk, 2002: 4). The index developed 
herein is a de jure measure, which we feel provides a better indication of the institutional 
framework of a country rather than its capacity to implement rules.    
Table B.1 (Appendix B) presents a summary of some of the existing measures and indices 
created using various de jure and de facto indicators. Notably, there are very few indices 
that cover a wide range of countries and those that do frequently face trade-offs between 
coverage and detail. Also, many measures fail to indicate the intensity of controls, often 
relying on binary variables that hide the subtle but important variations within regulations 
(i.e. saying that a country imposes a control does not indicate how rigid or restrictive that 
control is). Tamirisa (1999), Schindler (2009) and Chinn and Ito (2010) all create indices from 
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the AREAER showing exchange and capital control restrictiveness for 40, 91 and 182 
countries respectively (see Section 4 below). 
Measures that show actual capital movements, either from balance of payments or from 
financial markets data, attempt to provide a measure of de facto liberalisation (Table B1, 
rows 11-15).8  
3.4 Exchange Controls and Monetary Unions  
Exchange controls are important for monetary unions because they have to be either 
harmonized or removed within the monetary union, in order to create a consistent 
monetary policy within the region. The impact of exchange controls on monetary policy can 
be highlighted by reference to the famous ’Impossible Trinity Hypothesis’ (ITH). The ITH is 
an outcome of the Mundell-Flemming model of open-economy macroeconomics, which 
suggests that an economy cannot maintain (1) exchange rate stability, (2) free capital 
movement, and (3) an independent monetary policy simultaneously—although any two are 
possible (Figure 3.2).   
Of the 3 potentially desirable policy goals, the choice is usually understood as being 
between monetary policy independence or a fixed exchange rate, given the existence of 
capital mobility (Aizenman, et al., 2011). In this situation, the free movement of capital 
prevents a country from both maintaining a constant exchange rate and freely controlling its 
interest rates, as deviation of interest rates from that of its partners causes capital flows 
that strengthen or weaken the exchange rate.  
For SADC countries, the goal to achieve a monetary union means achieving some level of 
exchange rate stability with capital mobility, while sacrificing domestic monetary 
independence.  
There is some nuance here as to the degree of capital mobility required for a monetary 
union. Within a SADC monetary union there must be unrestricted capital mobility, but there 
could be a common wall of exchange and capital controls for the region. Thus, the common 
currency might not be subject to free capital mobility. Such is the case for the rand and the 
Common Monetary Area. 
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Figure 3.2 Impossible Trinity 
Closed financial markets 
And pegged exchange rate; 
e.g. Bretton Woods system 
 
 
 
 
 
             Monetary Independence                                                Exchange Rate Stability 
 
 
 
 
Floating exchange rate                      Monetary Union or 
                                                                         Financial Integration/                Currency Board 
                                                                           Capital Mobility                e.g. Euro system 
 
 Source: Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2008).   
 
3.5 Current Account - arguments for and against liberalisation 
The economics literature has a general consensus that the benefits outweigh the costs of a 
liberalised current account. Unrestricted payments for current account transactions have 
been an underlying requirement for IMF members, broadly known as Article VIII status (see 
Appendix C for a discussion on the IMF Articles of Agreement and its effects on exchange 
controls).  
Many studies, some noted below, argue that exchange controls are highly inefficient and do 
more harm than good. Exchange controls introduce a variety of distortions in the economy 
and undermine proper pricing and exchange rate valuation (Stockman & Hernandez, 1985). 
As many exchange controls are designed to restrict imports, a non-tariff barrier to trade is 
essentially created, which acts as a quota restriction on some or all imports (Greenwood & 
Kimbrough, 1987). Such restrictions also impact exports and the value of the real exchange 
rate in addition to its designed effect on import volumes. The implicit appreciation that 
often occurs with import restrictions makes exports less competitive, potentially requiring 
exporters to compensate by increasing productivity or reducing labour costs. If the latter 
strategy is followed, exchange controls can create an implicit tax on the labour content of 
exports. Exchange controls also lead to a reduction in international trade, especially if 
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partner countries simultaneously restrict imports through exchange controls (Tamirisa, 
1999). As freer trade is widely considered beneficial for growth and development, this 
reduction caused by exchange controls would have negative effects for a country’s social 
welfare. 
Liberalising current account restrictions and removing exchange controls also acts as a 
positive signal of a country’s commitment to good policy and economic governance 
(Bartolini & Drazen, 1996). This builds investor confidence and encourages an increase in 
capital flows and investment into the country as well as helping to reduce the amount of 
capital flight from the nation. Further, the administrative costs of exchange controls can be 
significant and, depending on the country’s economic position, it is debatable whether these 
are justified.  
Traditionally, current account controls were defended as a mechanism to conserve scarce 
foreign exchange and protect the foreign reserves of the country. Implicitly, this argument 
implied that there was some underlying policy creating disequilibrium in the exchange rate 
and reducing foreign reserves, which justified the use of protective administrative 
measures. In such a case, this implied a more appreciated exchange rate than the 
equilibrium level. Currently, the main justification for current account controls is to prevent 
illegal capital leakages, especially through the service account.  
Exchange controls are also purported to facilitate balance of payments data collection and 
help reduce tax evasion and money laundering. Today there are more efficient, effective 
and less costly ways of collecting data, including real time clearing systems operated by 
central banks. While tax evasion can often be a real problem, the modern view is that it is a 
tax administration problem and should not be addressed through exchange controls. Money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism are modern problems and often include some 
elements of exchange control systems. However, most countries have established “financial 
intelligence units” to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism.  
3.6 Capital Account – arguments for and against liberalisation 
Forbes (2006) makes a fitting analogy likening capital account liberalisation to the advent of 
the automobile. Cars come with a plethora of advantages and opportunities. They speed up 
the ways of getting from one point to another and create the potential for increased 
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productivity and growth. Similarly, open capital accounts allow many opportunities for 
different economic actors and provide faster avenues to achieve growth and development. 
However, with both cars and capital account liberalisation there is the risk of crashes, which 
needs to be considered and mitigated. Despite the risks Forbes notes, it is hard to imagine a 
developed country without cars and their associated benefits for development.  
There is still considerable debate regarding the cost-benefit of capital account liberalisation. 
An important question is “whether the theorems on the gains from free trade in goods, 
extend to free trade in financial capital” (Edwards, 1999: 2). The theoretical arguments in 
favour of capital account liberalisation suggest that they do. Free capital mobility allows for 
a more efficient global allocation of resources, increases capital flows for investment 
financing, creates opportunities for risk diversification, increases the efficiency of domestic 
financial sectors, promotes financial development, helps raise productivity and growth and 
signals a country’s commitment to good economic policies. 
The traditional argument for international allocative efficiency is based on resource flows 
from capital-rich countries with low rates of return to capital-scarce countries providing 
higher rates of return. This process can permanently raise the poorer country’s standard of 
living and general level of welfare. Open capital markets also help promote financial 
development in the home country (Edison, Klein, Ricci & Sløk, 2002: 20). The increase in the 
efficiency of the country’s financial sector then allows for a more efficient national 
allocation of capital as well as global allocation (Quinn & Inclan, 1997: 772). Financial 
openness is also beneficial to governments faced with low domestic saving rates, as the, 
which allows increased investment and consumption smoothing.  
Capital account liberalisation also provides opportunities for risk diversification (Edison, 
Klein, Ricci & Sløk, 2002: 1). As countries’ economic climates are not necessarily on the same 
cycles, open capital markets allow investors to insure themselves against volatility in their 
domestic markets by accessing international capital in countries experiencing different 
shocks at different times. This reduces volatility in income and consumption and raises 
welfare (Dooley, 1996: 640). Other possible externalities include the benefits from increased 
competition and technology improvements. 
Liberalising the capital account, as with the current account, acts as a potential signal of a 
country’s commitment to sound economic management and favourable future policies. If 
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governments allow free capital mobility, investors may believe that future impositions of 
controls are less likely to occur and therefore be more willing to invest.  
In general, capital account openness is acknowledged to have benefits that exceed the 
associated costs. Controls are agreed to be welfare reducing unless, as Cardoso and Goldfajn 
(1998: 163) argue, “they are a ‘second-best’ policy that mitigates the effects of another 
market failure”.  
Capital controls are usually motivated by a country’s desire to protect against the potentially 
harmful effects of fluctuations in international capital flows (Kose & Prasad, 2012). Placing 
restrictions on capital account transactions can decrease vulnerability to crises and reduce 
excessive macroeconomic volatility. This is especially relevant for ‘hot money’ or short 
terms flows and investments that can be easily and swiftly reversed. The resulting instability 
can have a negative effect on the real and financial economy, undermine investor 
confidence, lower domestic investment and hinder growth (Binici et al, 2010: 667).  
In the presence of imperfect information, the volatility enabled by free capital mobility is 
exacerbated through “excessive risk-taking and moral hazard”, increasing the likelihood of 
financial crises (Orlov, 2005: 80). The effect of any adverse macroeconomic shock is liable to 
be amplified by the swift reversal of short-term capital flows. Unregulated capital flows also 
tend to facilitate the spreading of currency crises, making a shock in one country affect a 
much wider group of actors (Edison, Klein, Ricci & Sløk, 2002: 1). Capital controls cannot 
fully protect a country against a crisis unless it has “sound policies in fundamentals” (Forbes, 
2006), but are believed to be a good “second best” measure.  
In light of the above, capital controls are simply often used to influence the composition of 
flows crossing borders, giving preference to longer-term inflows like FDI, and discouraging  
short-term flows like portfolio (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan & Sayek, 2004).  
Studies looking at the effects of capital account liberalisation do not return conclusive 
findings (Tables B.2 and B.3, Appendix B). Theoretically, capital account liberalisation and 
increased global financial integration9 are expected to directly or indirectly contribute 
towards growth; however the results are mixed. Of the 14 studies summarised in Table B.2, 
4 show a statistically significant, positive relationship between capital account liberalisation 
and growth; 5 find no statistically significant relationship, and the remaining 5 present 
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mixed results. As usual with studies of this kind, even when significant links are identified, 
conclusions regarding the causal nature of the relationships cannot be reliably extrapolated. 
In particular, there may be instances where reverse causality is at work and capital account 
liberalization is a function of the growth (Edison, Klein et al, 2002: 21).  
Moreover, the relationship between capital account liberalisation and growth (Table B.2) is 
not a simple linear one. Human capital, the depth of the domestic financial market and the 
quality of governance and macroeconomic policies together determine a country’s 
“absorptive capacity” (Prasad et al, 2002: 29). The positive spill-overs associated with 
increased capital account liberalisation are likely to be better integrated into economies 
with higher absorptive capacities. As such, certain levels of development or absorptive 
capacity represent “thresholds” or turning points. For example, there is some evidence that 
“the effect of foreign direct investment on growth depends on the level of human capital in 
a developing country” (Prasad et al, 2002: 29).  
Azman-saini, Law and Ahmad (2010) use a threshold regression model and find that the 
positive impact of FDI on growth “kicks in” only after financial market development exceeds 
a threshold level, before which its benefits are non-existent. Ding and Jinjarak (2012) also 
find evidence that the size of capital flows is positively correlated in a non-linear 
relationship with a country’s income level. They identify a three-stage threshold effect: “for 
low-income countries10, capital flight increases as the income level rises; and only after the 
economy passes a threshold band11 does capital flight decline with income” (Ding & Jinjarak, 
2012: 1). Artete, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001), however, argue that the sequencing of 
reforms is more important than a country’s stage of financial development and find that 
capital account liberalisation only has a positive relationship with growth in countries that 
are already more open. 
The studies reviewed in Table B.3 generally find that increased capital account liberalisation 
had no significant impact on the volatility of output, growth, consumption or investment. 
Capital controls were found to be associated with higher inflation and lower real interest 
rates in addition to acting as a significant barrier to trade. They are generally effective at 
influencing the volume and composition of flows in the short-run. 
The IMF has recently nuanced its position on the sequencing for liberalisation of capital 
flows and the use of capital flow management measures. First, the appropriate degree of 
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liberalisation for a country depends on its specific circumstances and level of financial 
development. Second, liberalisation should be carefully planned and sequenced in an 
integrated approach, particularly in the cases of emerging market economies. Third, the use 
of “capital flow management measures” on outflows may be beneficial in crisis or near crisis 
conditions, but only as a supplement to more fundamental policy adjustment (IMF, 2012). 
4. The New Restrictiveness Index 
The new Exchange Control Restrictiveness Index (ECRI) is created to provide a data set 
aimed specifically at the member states of SADC in order to examine the effects of exchange 
controls in the region. This is especially relevant within the context of the current 
assessment of the viability of regional integration among the 15 countries. The index adds 
value by providing several scores reflecting the extent and intensity of exchange controls. 
While the index is focussed on the 15 SADC states for the years 2000-2010, indices for a 
number of other countries are presented for 2010 for comparison purposes. 
Previous attempts at quantifying the level of de jure exchange and capital restrictions have 
relied on binary variables that tend to oversimplify the subtleties and range of restrictions. 
While quantifying the extent of de jure financial openness is a challenging task, it remains an 
important step in analysing the effects of the liberalisation process and the impact of 
restrictiveness within and across different countries. Here we have attempted to divide the 
restrictions published in the AREAER into elements of somewhat equal importance, and to 
assign ordinal scores to each restriction from 0-8 depending, based on the intensity and 
type of restriction imposed. This represents a significant departure from past attempts to 
treat all restrictions equally and by assigning each a 0/1 binary grading. We also provide 
breakdowns into separate categories to facilitate the analysis of different aspects of 
restrictiveness.  
4.1 Constructing the Index 
The index measures de jure capital account and exchange control restrictiveness of the 15 
member states of the SADC for the years 2000 – 2010. Until 1995, the AREAER was 
presented using binary dummy variables to indicate restrictiveness12 (Schindler, 2008: 224). 
Since 1995 however, the AREAER provides more in-depth information on openness to 
capital flows and contains summary tables with details on the restrictions in place for all IMF 
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member countries. The new index utilises this more structured and comprehensive 
approach. 
A set of 75 key restrictions in the AREAER is coded to create an aggregate score.13 The 
selection was done to reflect the major components that affect, with an equal weight, the 
exchange restrictiveness of a country. These 75 restrictions can be grouped into 5 broad 
categories, each of which forms its own sub-index (Table 4.1).  
 
If identified key restrictions are not relevant for a particular country or they are not 
reported by the country, then those restrictions are ignored. Thus, of the maximum 75 
restrictions to be coded, the minimum number of coded restrictions for any country was 63. 
The final score given to the country is relative to the number of coded restrictions. 
Whereas most existing indices use binary dummy variables, the new index is created using a 
graded scale of even numbers from 0 (no restrictions) to 8 (maximum restrictiveness). Table 
4.2 below describes the level of restrictiveness associated with each number.  
 
 
Table 4.1. Categories and Number of Coded Restrictions
12
10
14
12
27
Total 75
Capital account
Financial sector only
Applies to all
Number of restrictionsCategory of restriction
Goods
Services
Table 4.2. Coding Key
0 Totally liberalised/open.
2 Reporting required or issue of timing
4 Permission or high level of reporting required, significant timing restriction, license
6 Quantity restriction, but limits may not be very binding
8 Binding quantity restriction or total prohibitionMaximum restrictiveness
The index is contructed so that a higher number indicates greater restrictiveness
No restrictions
Low restrictiveness
Medium restrictiveness
High restrictiveness
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The sub-index percentages are calculated by dividing the sum of the numbers assigned to 
each individual field in the category by the total possible sum that could have been awarded 
(number of fields multiplied by maximum score). The overall index score for a country is 
then calculated as the aggregation of the sub-indices. For all scores, the index indicates the 
percentage of total possible restrictiveness that a country’s policy suggests. 
4.2 Strengths and Limitations of the Index  
Common to all exchange control indices is the trade-off presented between broad coverage 
(country and years) and detail. While only covering the 15 SADC member states for 10 years, 
the index’s main strength is its specificity in coding. The more detailed grading allows for a 
greater accuracy in reflecting the subtle distinctions between the restrictiveness of the 
countries included. This is further complimented by the break down into categories where 
the sub-components14 can be individually utilised or assessed at an aggregated level.  
One of the key shortcomings of the index is the bias created by missing information. This 
arises when countries fail to report on certain categories. Information that is not available, 
applicable or reported is removed from the count, which lowers the base and consequently 
affects the restrictiveness score. If a country is liberalised in the unreported field, the score 
will be higher than it should be. On the other hand, if the country is more restrictive in the 
unreported field, the missing information will result in a lower score being achieved, which 
creates a false impression of exchange control openness. This is particularly prevalent in 
2000, where a lot of fields were missing information15.  
While the index creates a measure of the intensity of exchange controls in a given SADC 
country, a substantial limitation is its failure to capture differences within the value of 
quantitative restrictions. A maximum score of 8 in any field indicates a binding quantitative 
restriction but does not distinguish between countries with generous (but still binding) 
quantitative restrictions and those with severe limits. A country like South Africa, whose 
strategy is to increase the amounts allowed within a particular restriction, would receive the 
same score in the index regardless of the progressive relaxation of its limits. Despite this, 
the index still allows for a comprehensive scoring that captures much of the subtleties 
between different countries’ external account transaction restrictiveness. 
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4.3 Correlation with Other Indices 
We check the ECRI against other existing measures and find that it correlates quite highly 
(Table 4.3). There are two other main de jure exchange control and capital account 
openness indices frequently cited in literature (Schindler and Chinn-Ito), each with its own 
distinct strengths and limitations. While the ECRI focuses on detail at the expense of a broad 
year and country coverage, others have more simple measures with an extensive coverage.  
 
 
The Chinn-Ito Index captures data for 182 countries spanning the time period from 1970-
2010 using binary dummy variables where a 0 value is given to a restricted component. This 
means that higher values reflect a country that is more open to cross-border capital 
transactions (Chinn & Ito, 2008: 5). 
The Schindler Index spans 91 countries from 1995-2005. While it still uses some binary 
coding (e.g. for resident versus non-resident restrictions), it uses information at a 
disaggregated level with different sub-indices. 
4.4 Some Observations of the Index 
The index displays a significant range of restrictiveness between SADC countries (on average 
a difference of 47%). This makes sense given the substantial differences in economic growth 
and prosperity, governance regimes, and institutional quality within the region.  Figure 4.1 
shows the variation in the range of the ECRI across all 15 SADC countries for 2010. The index 
totals for all 15 countries for 2000-2010 can be found in Appendix A as well as the complete 
breakdown for each country for 2010. 
 
Table 4.3. Correlation Coefficients with Other Indices
2000 2005 2010
Chinn-Ito* -0.89 -0.92 -0.95
Schindler 0.84 0.87 N.A
* The negative correlation arises because higher values in 
the Chinn-Ito index reflect a country that is more open 
to cross-border capital transactions.
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Table 4.4 shows the 2010 ECRI component values as well as their averages and liberalisation 
rank for all SADC member states. On average, the majority of exchange controls are 
concentrated on the capital account – the most restrictive component. 
The ECRI also indicates that while some SADC countries have become on average (slightly) 
more restrictive between 2000 and 2010, the biggest changes in restrictiveness came from 
those member states becoming more liberalised (ranging from an approximate 4.5% 
decrease in restrictiveness from Namibia and South Africa to a 27% decrease from 
Zimbabwe). Figure 4.2 presents the standard deviation and average of the ECRI for each 
year 2000-2010 across all SADC countries. A noteworthy trend is the declining average from 
2005 onwards. This could in part reflect the liberalisation effort that came about after SADC 
began pushing its member states to become less restrictive.  
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Figure 4.1. ECRI - SADC 2010 
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             Source: Compiled by authors.  
 
 
12.5
13
13.5
14
14.5
15
15.5
16
16.5
17
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 209 2010
St
an
d
ar
d
 D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
Figure 4.2. Standard Deviation and Average of ECRI for SADC 
(2000 - 2010) 
G
oo
ds
 
R
es
tr
ic
t
Se
rv
ic
e 
R
es
tr
ic
t
C
ap
it
al
 
A
cc
ou
nt
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
se
ct
or
 o
nl
y
A
pp
lie
s 
to
 
al
l
O
ve
ra
ll
R
an
k
Angola 47.9 72.2 68.2 41.7 56.7 57.1 15
Botswana 14.6 0.0 28.6 29.5 16.0 18.1 4
DRC 41.7 27.5 48.2 41.7 26.9 35.7 7
Lesotho 39.6 55.0 61.5 29.2 35.2 42.2 10
Madagascar 20.8 11.1 44.6 45.0 36.0 32.3 6
Malawi 39.6 60.0 53.6 41.7 38.0 44.9 13
Mauritius 27.1 0.0 28.6 25.0 9.3 17.0 3
Mozambique 39.6 50.0 48.2 52.1 38.0 44.0 11
Namibia 41.7 65.0 57.7 47.5 30.8 44.7 12
Seychelles 12.5 0.0 5.4 10.4 10.6 8.4 1
South Africa 39.6 55.0 55.4 52.1 20.2 39.9 9
Swaziland 39.6 70.0 55.4 56.3 33.7 47.3 14
Tanzania 37.5 15.0 53.6 47.7 28.0 35.7 8
Zambia 20.8 0.0 5.4 8.3 13.5 10.5 2
Zimbabwe 22.9 10.0 62.5 33.3 16.0 28.1 5
Average 32.4 32.7 45.1 37.4 27.2 33.7
Table 4.4. ECRI - 2010 
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By international comparison, SADC is not very liberalised in terms of exchange controls. 
Figure 4.3 shows the ECRI for a number of industrial nations; emerging markets and other 
African countries in comparison to SADC (see Appendix A for details). While the fully 
liberalised SADC member states average out to a similar level compared with the industrial 
nations, the rest of SADC is far behind.  
 
 
5. Applications of the Exchange Control Restrictiveness Index 
The correlation values shown in this section (Table 5.1 and Appendix D), while in no way 
conclusive, provide some interesting exploratory findings using the new restrictiveness 
index and offer avenues for potential future studies. It is important to note that the 
following analysis was focussed only on SADC and has no implications outside of the region. 
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5.1 Do Exchange Controls Hurt Growth? 
The correlations of GDP growth and the restrictiveness index are fairly low (-0.33, -0.32 and 
-0.45 for 2000, 2005 and 2010 respectively) and all negative. This is in keeping with the 
theory that fewer exchange controls and more financial integration is beneficial for 
productivity and growth.  
Figure 5.1 shows a scatter chart plotting the points of growth and restrictiveness for each of 
the SADC member states16. The linear trend lines indicate the negative relationship that 
exists. 
 
Table 5.1. Correlations with ECRI
2000 2005 2010
1 GDP Growth (%) -0.33 -0.32 -0.45
2 Financial Sector Depth
NCP/GDP 0.044 -0.037 0.002
NCP/GDP excl outliers* -0.321 -0.316 -0.356
CIC/M2 0.468 0.291 -0.144
CIC/M2 excl outliers** 0.525 0.667 0.541
3 Balance of Payments
3a Net Foreign Assets/GDP -0.161 -0.424 -0.398
NFA/GDP excl Zambia -0.391 -0.626 -0.623
3b Errors & Omissions/GDP 0.073 -0.071 -0.102
Notes: Growth correlation for 2005 excludes data on Angola
* South Africa & Zambia
** Angola, Seychelles, South Africa & Zambia
Source: Authors ' ca lculations  based on data  from World Bank 
African Development Indicators  (2010); IMF International  
Financia l  Statis tics  and ECRI.
Data for CIC/M2 for 2010 uses 2009 data (2010 
unavaliable for a large number of countries)
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5.2 Do Exchange Controls Affect Financial Development? 
As indicators for financial sector depth, net credit to the private sector (NCP) and total cash 
in circulation (CIC) as ratios of GDP and M2 respectively, are used. A higher NCP/GDP ratio 
indicates greater financial development (an expected negative correlation with the ECRI) 
while a higher CIC/M2 ratio implies a lower level of financial development (an expected 
positive correlation with the ECRI). Initially, the NCP/GDP correlation is negligible and the 
CIC/M2 correlation inconsistent. On further examination of the underlying data (Appendix 
B), this makes sense as a few countries skew the results17. The correlations (although still 
low) return more expected values when the outliers are omitted from the calculation (row 3 
and 5 of Table 5.1). NCP/GDP correlations change from 0.002 to -0.356 in 2010 and CIC/M2 
from 0.468, 0.291 and -0.144 to 0.525, 0.667 and 0.541 for 2000, 2005 and 2010 
respectively, which fall within the anticipated range and relationship direction. 
5.3 Exchange Controls and the BoP  
a) Do Exchange Controls Protect Foreign Reserves?  
Net Foreign Assets as a ratio of GDP (NFA/GDP) return an initially low negative correlation 
with the ECRI (-0.424 in 2005 and -0.398 in 2010). The correlations become more significant 
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when Zambia (a substantial outlier) is excluded, increasing to -0.626 in 2005 and -0.623 in 
2010. The negative sign implies that greater restrictiveness is associated with a lower 
NFA/GDP ratio. This suggests that increasing foreign exchange restrictions may not protect 
or sustain high foreign reserves. 
b) Do Exchange Controls Facilitate Effective Data Collection? 
As the final line of correlations in Table 5.1 shows, there is no correlation between the 
errors and omissions data and the ECRI. This challenges the argument for using exchange 
controls to aid data collection.  
5.4 Are Exchange Controls a Good Measure of Institutions? 
Table D.3 (Appendix D) correlates the areas and components of the Economic Freedom of 
the World (EFW) dataset with the ECRI. Areas 3 and 4, capturing ‘Access to Sound Money’ 
and ‘Freedom to Trade Internationally’, are significantly correlated with exchange and 
capital control restrictiveness. In particular, the sub-components ‘Freedom to own foreign 
currency bank accounts’ and ‘International capital market controls’ return high correlations 
of 0.84 and 0.755 respectively over the two years. This also gives further credibility to the 
quality of the ECRI as these EFW measures are constructed from different data to our index 
but still show significant correlations. 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The perceived need of SADC to measure its regional integration initiative motivated this 
analysis of exchange controls in the region. There are few quantitative measures of 
exchange and capital controls that exist in the literature, and this paper took a new 
approach to the measurement issue, by using ordinal levels of measurement rather than 
simply a binary approach. The Exchange Control Restrictiveness Index (ECRI) that was 
created broke down exchange controls into 5 sub-categories, which addresses the lack of 
refined de jure measures of differing categories of controls and aids further analysis into the 
topics of regional integration and the effects of exchange and capital controls. The index 
showed that while at present there is substantial variation between the restrictiveness of 
the 15 SADC member states, all but 2 countries have made advancements in lowering 
restrictions over the past decade.  
25 
 
If SADC aspires to achieve monetary union, it will have to create a regional community with 
free movement of capital internally, although it could have a common set of external 
exchange controls. The variation in the ECRIs among SADC countries highlights the 
substantial variation among the restrictiveness of the 15 SADC member states, which would 
have to be harmonized. For analytical purposes, the authors grouped the SADC countries 
into 3 groups for exchange control purposes: (1) four liberalised countries; (2) the four CMA 
countries with the same regulations; and (3) the seven other non-liberalised countries. 
Moreover, SADC as a whole appears quite restrictive by international comparison. The 
differences in exchange controls highlight the potential regulatory hurdles in trying to create 
a monetary union. 
Economic theory and research has been fairly consistent about the benefits of current 
account liberalisation for growth and development. In this respect, the ECRI for goods 
tended to be relatively low for most SADC countries, although still much too high for states 
aspiring for a free trade area. Moreover, the ECRI on services was relatively high, which 
came as a surprise. The rationale for many restrictions tends to emphasize the benefits to 
the national economic welfare while denying commercial agents the right to make their own 
decision. 
The debate regarding the desirability and consequences of capital account restrictions is 
more open to debate. Economic theory says that liberalising the capital account allows for a 
more efficient global allocation of resources, increases capital flows for investment, creates 
opportunities for risk diversification, increases the efficiency of domestic financial sectors, 
promotes financial development, helps raise productivity and growth and signals a country’s 
commitment to good economic policies. At the same time, research indicates that there can 
be substantial costs associated with volatile short-term capital flows that can have a 
negative impact on growth and development. This is particularly true for developing 
countries that have less developed financial sectors.  
Whether countries that liberalise become increasingly vulnerable to financial disruptions or 
actually create the conditions for more rapid development and growth is unclear from 
reviewing the existing empirical literature. While the evidence suggests that there are likely 
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to be risks involved with pursuing greater financial integration, resisting liberalisation over 
an extended period of time may prove both futile and counterproductive.  
Kose and Prasad (2012) argued that sound domestic policies and institutions, a solid 
regulatory framework promoting a strong and efficient financial sector, and effective 
monitoring systems for capital flows greatly improve the chances of maximising the benefits 
of liberalisation whilst minimising the associated risks and costs. As an important part of the 
process towards regional integration, SADC member states will need to pursue liberalisation 
with these fundamentals in mind, at the very least, they should be internally liberalised to 
achieve the proposed goal of monetary unification.  
Finally, the paper attempts to suggest the potential impact of exchange controls on other 
financial, economic and structural variables, through a simple correlation analysis. This 
preliminary analysis indicated a negative relationship between growth and exchange 
restrictiveness. The ECRI was also found to be well correlated with several other structural 
measures of poor governance and low regulatory standards, which might explain its 
negative relationship with growth.  The ECRI had a negative correlation with NFA, opposite 
to what was expected, and might therefore indicate that the direction of causality runs from 
reserves to exchange controls as opposed to vice versa. The measures of financial sector 
development seemed to indicate that greater financial sector development is associated 
with less exchange control restrictiveness.  
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Australia 12.5 0 21.4 12.5 7.7 10.8
Brazil 41.7 7.5 37.5 64.6 26 34.5
Chile 6.3 0 41.1 37.5 5.8 16.9
China 39.6 42.5 66.1 60.4 30.8 45.3
Cote d'Ivoire 45.8 42.5 55.4 56.3 44.2 48.3
Germany 10.4 0 32.1 18.8 9.6 14.2
Ghana 35.4 20.0 25 27.1 27.9 27.4
India 59.1 57.5 78.6 50 42 55.4
Japan 12.5 15 32.1 4.2 9.6 14.2
Kenya 12.5 0 26.8 39.6 8.7 16.6
Malaysia 47.9 0 50.0 47.9 37 38
Mexico 14.6 0 32.1 62.5 26 27.7
Nigeria 45.8 52.5 26.8 52.5 28.1 37.9
Russia 25 7.5 26.8 35 21.2 22.9
Turkey 16.7 7.5 32.1 31.3 20.2 22
UK 10.4 0 7.1 6.3 4.6 5.7
USA 10.4 0 30.4 2.1 9.6 11.1
Table A.2. Index Values for Comparison Countries (2010)
Appendix A: Summary of the Exchange Control Restrictiveness Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1. Index Values for SADC Member States (2000 - 2010)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 209 2010
Angola 58.1 62.7 61.5 60.9 59.6 57.8 59.0 _ 58.3 _ 56.0
Botswana 16.1 16.1 14.5 14.5 14.9 18.5 18.3 16.3 15.3 17.9 17.9
DRC 41.3 39.0 39.2 37.1 34.6 34.6 34.3 34.4 35.8 36.8 35.7
Lesotho 41.8 _ _ _ _ 44.7 _ _ _ _ 42.2
Madagascar 28.0 29.0 29.4 29.0 28.9 29.4 27.7 25.9 28.8 30.4 31.9
Malawi 45.2 47.5 46.2 45.8 45.8 46.3 45.9 43.3 45.3 44.9 44.9
Mauritius 13.5 16.0 16.0 14.6 14.6 15.8 15.8 15.1 15.1 18.2 16.8
Mozambique 38.8 40.2 40.7 40.7 40.7 43.4 44.7 44.9 41.9 42.3 41.7
Namibia 49.2 _ _ _ _ 52.7 _ _ _ _ 44.7
Seychelles 22.2 25.8 25.8 25.8 33.5 30.9 25.4 25.4 15.3 9.7 9.7
South Africa 44.0 43.5 39.9 43.8 41.7 42.1 41.4 43.8 43.2 41.9 39.9
Swaziland 54.8 _ _ _ _ 49.6 _ _ _ _ 47.3
Tanzania 32.1 32.1 33.2 33.7 33.7 35.2 34.4 35.3 35.3 37.3 36.1
Zambia 8.6 7.1 7.4 7.0 7.4 9.1 8.7 9.3 10.6 9.7 9.3
Zimbabwe 56.3 59.6 60.4 61.8 62.9 61.4 63.0 62.7 51.7 50.3 29.7
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TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
Sum 46.0 50.0 54.0 30.0 120.0 300.0 14.0 0.0 32.0 28.0 26.0 100.0 40.0 22.0 54.0 40.0 58.0 214.0
No. 
Items
12.0 9.0 11.0 9.0 26.0 67.0 11.0 10.0 14.0 11.0 24.0 70.0 12.0 10.0 14.0 12.0 27.0 75.0
Index 
(%)
47.9 69.4 61.4 41.7 57.7 56.0 15.9 0.0 28.6 31.8 13.5 17.9 41.7 27.5 48.2 41.7 26.9 35.7
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TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
Sum 38.0 44.0 64.0 28.0 76.0 250.0 20.0 8.0 50.0 18.0 70.0 166.0 38.0 48.0 60.0 40.0 76.0 262.0
No. 
Items
12.0 10.0 13.0 12.0 27.0 74.0 12.0 9.0 14.0 5.0 25.0 65.0 12.0 10.0 14.0 12.0 25.0 73.0
Index 
(%)
39.6 55.0 61.5 29.2 35.2 42.2 20.8 11.1 44.6 45.0 35.0 31.9 39.6 60.0 53.6 41.7 38.0 44.9
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TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
Sum 22.0 0.0 38.0 18.0 20.0 98.0 32.0 40.0 52.0 52.0 74.0 250.0 40.0 52.0 60.0 38.0 64.0 254.0
No. 
Items
12.0 10.0 14.0 12.0 25.0 73.0 12.0 10.0 14.0 12.0 27.0 75.0 12.0 10.0 13.0 10.0 26.0 71.0
Index 
(%)
22.9 0.0 33.9 18.8 10.0 16.8 33.3 50.0 46.4 54.2 34.3 41.7 41.7 65.0 57.7 47.5 30.8 44.7
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TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
Sum 14.0 0.0 8.0 12.0 24.0 58.0 38.0 44.0 62.0 50.0 42.0 236.0 38.0 56.0 62.0 54.0 70.0 280.0
No. 
Items
12.0 10.0 14.0 12.0 27.0 75.0 12.0 10.0 14.0 12.0 26.0 74.0 12.0 10.0 14.0 12.0 26.0 74.0
Index 
(%)
14.6 0.0 7.1 12.5 11.1 9.7 39.6 55.0 55.4 52.1 20.2 39.9 39.6 70.0 55.4 56.3 33.7 47.3
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TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
Sum 28.0 14.0 60.0 40.0 66.0 208.0 16.0 0.0 4.0 8.0 28.0 56.0 20.0 8.0 64.0 26.0 58.0 176.0
No. 
Items
11.0 10.0 14.0 11.0 26.0 72.0 12.0 10.0 14.0 12.0 27.0 75.0 12.0 10.0 14.0 12.0 26.0 74.0
Index 
(%)
31.8 17.5 53.6 45.5 31.7 36.1 16.7 0.0 3.6 8.3 13.0 9.3 20.8 10.0 57.1 27.1 27.9 29.7
Table A.3. Complete ECRI Components for SADC - 2010
TANZANIA ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE
MAURITIUS MOZAMBIQUE NAMIBIA
SEYCHELLES SOUTH AFRICA SWAZILAND
ANGOLA BOTSWANA DRC
LESOTHO MADAGASCAR MALAWI
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
 
Table B.1. Summary of Restrictiveness Data & Indices 
 Name Source Description Range Year 
Country 
Coverage 
Baseline Restrictiveness Data 
1 
IMF 
(until 
1995) 
IMF 
AREAER, 
line 
E2, various 
issues 
Constructed as an on/off 
indicator of the 
existence of rules/restrictions 
that inhibit 
cross-border flows. 
0 (never restricted) 
to 
1 (always restricted) 
1967 – 1995 
after which 
format 
changes 
117 countries for 
years 1976-95 
to 
137 countries for 
years 1986 -95 
2 
IMF 
(1996 
onwards) 
IMF 
AREAER, 
various 
issues 
Constructed as a narrative 
description of the existence or 
rules/restrictions that inhibit 
cross-border flows. 
Narrative 
descriptions of 
restrictions 
1996 - 2011 
All members 
states for each 
year of issue 
De Jure Measures 
3 Share 
AREAER, 
line 
E2, various 
issues 
Uses IMF measure to create 
proportion of 
years that capital account is 
judged free of 
restrictions. Can be constructed 
for any range, 
1966-95. 
0 (never restricted) 
to 
1 (always restricted) 
1967 – 1995 
after which 
format 
changes 
117 (76-95) to 
137 (86-95) 
4 Tamirisa 
Tamirisa 
(1999) using 
AREAER 
data  
16 categories measuring the 
extent of exchange and capital 
controls based on data from the 
IMF’s AREAER. 
1 (prohibitions, 
quantitative limits, 
approval and 
registration 
Requirements) 
0 (measures for 
statistical purposes, 
administrative 
verification, liberal 
granting of licenses 
& no restrictions) 
1996 
40 countries of 
which 15 are 
industrial 
countries, 19 are 
developing and 6 
are transitional 
economies. 
5 Schindler 
Schindler 
 (2010) 
using 
AREAER 
data 
Measure of de jure restrictions of 
cross-border financial 
transactions using the IMF’s 
AREAER. 
Disaggregated 
categories coded in 
binary form: 
0 (unrestricted) 
1 (restricted) 
1995 – 2005 
91 countries of 
which 35 are high 
income, 42 
middle income 
and 14 low-
income countries. 
6 KAOPEN 
Chinn & Ito 
(2010) using 
AREAER 
data 
Index measuring a country’s 
degree of capital account  
openness based on the binary 
dummy variables that codify the 
tabulation  
of restrictions on cross-border 
financial transactions reported in 
the IMF’s  
AREAER. 
0 (restricted) 
and 
1 (unrestricted) 
 
(reversed to reflect 
openness rather 
than controls) 
 
1970 – 2010 
181 (1970-2005) 
to 182 countries 
(2005-2010) 
7 Quinn 
Quinn 
(1997) using 
AREAER 
pre-1996 
Constructed from narrative 
descriptions in  
AREAER regarding capital account  
restrictions. 
Larger numbers 
mean less  
Restricted. 
 
. Values in ½ point 
increments, 0 – 4 
Full Sample:  
1958, 1973,  
982, and 
1988 
63 countries of 
which 20 are  
advanced and 43 
are developing  
countries 
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Table B.1. Continued 
8 ΔQuinn Quinn (1997) Difference in Quinn Indicators 
Actual Ranges for 
Capital  
Account  
1988 – 1982; -1 to 2  
1988 – 1973; -2 to 2 
Construct 
from 
dates above 
63 countries of 
which 20 are  
advanced and 43 
are developing  
countries 
9 
OECD-
Share 
Code of  
Liberalisation  
of Capital  
Movements   
Proportion of the 11 categories 
free of  
restrictions, averaged over the 
relevant period. 
0 (always restricted) 
to   
1 (never restricted) 
1986, 1988,  
1990, 1993,  
1995 
21 OECD 
countries 
10 MR 
Montiel &  
Reinhart  
(1999) 
Measures the intensity of 
capital account  
restrictions   
0 (unrestricted),   
1 (mild restrictions),  
 2 (severe 
restrictions) 
Annual, 
1990 -  
1996 
15 emerging 
markets 
De Facto Measures 
11 
Levine/ 
Zervos & 
Henry 
Levine and  
Zervos  
(1998) and  
Henry (2000a  
and b) 
Dates of stock market 
liberalizations in  
emerging markets. 
Constructed as 0/1 
dummies  
for event studies or 
Share of  
years open for 
cross-section. 
Earliest: 
May  
86.  
Latest: Dec. 
91 
11 emerging 
markets 
12 BHL 
Bekaert  
Harvey &  
Lundblad,  
2001 
Dates of stock market 
liberalizations in  
emerging markets and 
industrial economies. 
Constructed to be 
between 0  
and 1 
Earliest: 
1980,  
Latest: 1997 
95 countries. 43 
had some  
experience with 
financial  
liberalization (25 
emerging  
market, 18 OECD) 
13 EW 
Edison and  
Warnock  
(2001) 
One minus the ratio of the IFC 
investable  
index to the IFC global index 
Constructed as 
percent of  
GDP 
Earliest 
1988 to  
present 
29 emerging 
markets 
14 
Capital 
Flows 
Kraay (1998) 
Measure based on actual 
capital flows 
Constructed as 
percent of  
GDP 
 
All countries with 
BOP Statistics 
15 
Capital 
Stocks 
Lane and  
Milesi- 
Ferretti  
(2001) 
Measure based on 
accumulated or stock of  
gross capital flows. 
Constructed as 
percent of  
GDP 
Earliest 
1970 -  
1998 
70 countries, mix 
of advanced  
and developing 
Source: Adapted from Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sløk (2002) 
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Table B.2. Overview of the Studies of the Impact of Capital Account Liberalisation on Growth
Study Countries
Liberalisation 
Measure
Dependent Variable and Estimation Method Main Results for GDP Growth Effect on Growth
Grilli & Milesi-
Ferretti, 1995
61 Share
Growth in income per capita for five-year 
non-overlapping periods during 1971 - 1994. 
IV estimation.
No evidence of a significant effect of Share on 
growth of income per capita.
No effect
Quinn 1997 58
ΔQuinn, betweem 
1988 and 1958
Growth in income per capita 1960 - 1989. 
Cross Section, OLS
ΔQuinn significantly raises growth in income 
per capita, though no regression in presented 
with both ΔCapital Controls and ΔOpenness.
Positive
Rodrik, 1998 About 100 Share
Growth in income per capita over 1975 - 
1995. Cross Section, OLS.
No evidence of a significant effect of Share on 
growth of income per capita.
No effect
Kraay, 1998
64, 94, or 
117
Share; Quinn; or 
Volume
Growth in income per capita over 1975 - 
1995. Cross Section, OLS & IV. Samples of 117 
(Share), 94 (Volume) or 64 (Quinn).
No effect of Share or Quinn on Growth. 
Coefficient on Volume significant and positive.
No effect or, at 
best, mixed
Klein & Olivei 
2000
67 Share
Growth in income per capita, 1976 - 1995. 
Cross Section, IV. Change in Financial Depth 
(ΔFD) as a function of Share and then per 
capita income growth as a function of 
instrumented value of ΔFD (and initial FD).
Significant effect of Share on ΔFD, though 
results seem to be driven by OECD countries in 
sample. Significant effect of instrumented 
values of ΔFD and FD on growth.
Positive
Edwards 2001 55 to 62
Quinn in 1988; or 
ΔQuinn 1988 - 
1973
Growth in income per capita 1980 - 1989. 
Cross Section. WLS (1985 GDP as weight), IV. 
Also uses interaction of Quinn in 1988 and 
log(GDP in 1980).
Quinn level significantly raises GDP growth. 
Interaction suggests that, at low GDP, opening 
capital account may lower GDP growth.
Positive, except 
for poor countries
Artete, 
Eichgreen & 
Wyplotz, 2001
51 to 59
Quinn in Initial 
Year; or ΔQuinn 
over relevant 
period
Growth in income per capita 1973 - 81, 1982 - 
87, 1988 - 92, or pooled for these 3 periods. 
Follows Edwards (2001) but with OLS rather 
than WLS and with different instruments.
Quinn significant for pooled results but not for 
shorter subsamples. ΔQuinn not significant. 
Significant effect of interaction of Quinn with 
either quality of law or openness.
Mixed
Bekaert, Harvey 
& Lundblad, 
2001
30 
Emerging 
markets
Official Dates of 
Stock Market 
Liberalisation
Growth in income per capita for various time 
periods between 1981 and 1997, resulting in 
overlapping data.
Stock market liberalisation significantly 
contributes to growth in income per capita, 
with largest effects shortly after liberalisation.
Positive
O'Donnell, 2001 94 Share or Volume
Growth in income per capita over 1971 - 
1994. Regressions include interaction 
between FD and Share, and Volume and FD.
Neither Share nor interaction of Share and FD 
significant, but Volume sometimes significant.
No effect or, at 
best, mixed
Chanda, 2001
57 non-
OECD
Share
Growth in income per capita over 1975 - 
1995. Share interacted with measure of 
ethnic heterogeneity.
Share significantly raises growth in ethnically 
heterogenous countries and significantly 
lowers it in ethnically homogenous countries.
Mixed
Reisen & Soto, 
2001
44 Share
Growth in income per capita over 1986-1997. 
IV and GMM used for regression.
Statistically significant positive growth impact 
of foreign direct and portfolio equity flows but 
negative for current bank lending.
Mixed
Edison, Klein, 
Ricci & Sløk, 
2002
Up to 89
Share, Quinn, 
ΔQuinn, Stock 
market dates from 
Bekaert et al.
Growth in real per capita GDP over 1973-
1995.
Mixed, but find some support for a positive 
effect of capital account liberalization on 
growth, especially for developing countries
Mixed
Edison, Levine, 
Ricci & Sløk, 
2002
57
Use five different 
measures of 
international 
financial 
integration.
Growth in real per capita GDP over 1980-
2000. OLS, 2SLS IV & GMM.
Unable to reject the null hypothesis that 
international financial integration does not 
accelerate economic growth even when 
controlling for particular  economic, financial, 
institutional, and policy characteristics.
No effect
Klein, 2005 71 Share
Growth in real per capita income over 1976-
1995.
Countries with better (but not the best) 
institutions exibit a statistically significant and 
economically meaningful, non-monotonic 
interaction between the responsiveness of 
growth to capital account liberalisation.
Positive
Source:  Authors' update based on Edison, Klein, Ricci & Sl øk, 2002: 35.
NOTES: Share is proportion of years that IMF's AREAR shows open capital accounts. Quinn is Quinn's 0 - 4 measure of capital intensity. ΔQuinn is change in value of 
Quinn 0 - 4 measure. Volume is measure of volume of capital flows. Cross Section refers to 1 observation per country.
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Table B.3. Overview of Studies of the Impact of Capital Account Liberalisation
Study
Countries & 
Year Coverage
Liberalisation 
Measure
Dependent Variable and 
Estimation Method
Main Results
Razin & Rose, 
1994, Y, C & I 
VOLATILITY
138 countries 
over 1950-1988
Dummy variables 
(1=capital controls 
present) based on 
IMF's AREAER and 
Pritchett openness 
data (1991).
GDP per capita for Y, with 
standard deviations of 
detrended vairables for 
volatility.
No significant empirical link between 
financial openness and the volatility of Y, C 
or I.
Easterly, Islam 
& Stiglitz, 2001, 
Y VOLATILITY
74 countries 
over 1960-1997
Actual capital flows as 
a ratio of GDP
Standard deviation of real 
GDP per capita growth.
Neither financial openness nor the 
volatility of capital flows has a signficant 
impact on output volatility. A more 
developed financial sector, however, is 
associated with lower volatility.
Buch, Döpke & 
Pierdzioch, 
2005,                       
Y VOLATILITY
24 OECD 
countries for 
1960-2000
Actual capital flows as 
a ratio of GDP as well 
as de jure  controls.
Business cycle volatility. 
Band-pass filter used.
No consistent empirical relationship 
between financial openness and volatility 
of output.
O'Donnell, 
2001,                           
Y VOLATILITY
93 countries 
over 1971-1994
Share or Volume
Income per capita. 
Regressions include 
interaction between FD 
and Share, and Volume 
and FD.
Higher degree of financial integration is 
associated with lower (higher) output 
volatility in OECD (non-OECD) countries. 
Countries with more developed financial 
sectors are more able to reduce output 
volatility through financial integration.
Grilli & Milesi-
Ferretti, 1995, 
INFLATION & 
REAL INTEREST 
RATES
Panel data for 
61 countries 
over 1960-1989
Dummy variables 
(1=capital controls 
present) based on 
IMF's AREAER.
Annual rate of change of 
Consumer Price Index for 
inflation and long-term 
nominal interest rate on 
goverment debt minus 
actual inflation for interest 
rates. OLS and WLS.
Capital controls are found to be associated 
with higher inflation and lower real 
interest rates.
Tamirisa, 1999,                     
TRADE
Cross-sectional 
data for 42 
countries for 
1996
Own index of capital 
and exchange 
controls based on 
IMF's AREAER tables
Bilateral exports of goods 
and services using a gravity-
model framework.
Controls on capital payments and transfers 
are a notable barrier to trade in all but 
industrial countries. Controls on current 
payments and transfers reduce bilateral 
trade flows insignificantly.
Cardosa & 
Goldfajn, 1998, 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OF CONTROLS
Brazil, 1983-
1995
Own index of changes 
in restrictions on 
capital inflows and 
outflows.
Effect of controls on both 
total flows and 
compositions of actual 
flows. IV and vector auto-
regressions.
Controls have been temporarily effective 
in altering levels and compositions of 
capital flows but have had no significant or 
sustained effects in the long-run.
Binici, 
Hutchinson & 
Schindler, 2010,                
EFFECTIVNESS 
OF CONTROLS
74 countries 
during 1995-
2005
Panel data set of 
capital controls, 
disaggregated by 
asset class and by 
inﬂows/outﬂows 
based on Lane & 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
Effect of controls on actual 
flows (volume and 
composition).
Capital controls can affect both the volume 
and the composition of capital ﬂows. In 
particular, both debt and equity controls 
can substantially reduce outﬂows, with 
little effect on capital inﬂows, but only 
high-income countries appear able to 
effectively impose debt (outﬂow) controls. 
NOTES: Y = output, C = Consumption and I = investment; Share is proportion of years that IMF's AREAR shows open capital 
accounts. Volume is measure of volume of capital flows. 
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Appendix C: Article VIII and Article XIV status 
 
The IMF has played an important role in promoting the liberalisation of the current account. 
When a country becomes a member state of the IMF, it is obliged under the Articles of 
Agreement to refrain from imposing distortionary current account restrictions. There are 
two articles members can commit to: Article VIII and Article XIV. Under the first, members 
may not introduce or reintroduce current account restrictions without permission from the 
IMF, may not engage in multiple currency practices (such as dual exchange rates or different 
exchange rates for different types of transactions) and must allow their national currency to 
be freely exchanged for all current account transactions including visible and invisible trade, 
income and transfers (IMF, 2011).  
 
If a member state feels unable to commit to the Article VIII stipulations, there is the option 
of adopting the arrangements under Article XIV, which permits members to impose 
temporary exchange controls with the view to removing them as soon as it is viable to do so 
(Section 2, IMF). Article VIX requires that: “any member retaining any restrictions 
inconsistent with Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, or 4 shall consult the Fund annually as to their 
further retention” and “maintain and adapt to changing circumstances the restrictions on 
payments and transfers for current international transactions that were in effect on the 
date on which it became a member” (Section 2) (IMF, 2011). Under Article VIX, members 
may not: “without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments 
and transfers for current international transactions” (Section 2) or “engage in any 
discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices” (Section 3) (IMF, 
2011). 
 
The number of IMF member countries subscribing to Article VIII has risen from 150 in 2001 
to 175 in 2010, at which point only 19 countries continued to subscribe to Article XIV 
(Jefferis, 2011). Articles VIII and XIV apply only to current account transactions. There are no 
limitations on the ability of members to impose restrictions on capital account transactions. 
It is generally accepted that exchange controls should be kept to a minimum. 
 
As is evident from this paper, a country that accepts Article VIII status does not mean that it 
does not have any current account restrictions.  
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Appendix D: Correlation Data 
 
 
 
 
Table D.1. GDP Growth & ECRI Data
Country 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010
Angola 3.0 20.6 2.3 56.3 57.8 57.1
Botswana 5.9 1.6 7.2 15.2 18.9 18.1
Congo, DR -6.9 6.5 7.2 41.3 34.1 35.7
Lesotho 5.7 1.1 3.3 41.8 44.7 42.2
Madagascar 4.8 4.6 1.6 27.0 29.4 32.3
Malawi 1.6 2.6 7.1 42.5 48.1 44.9
Mauritius 9.0 1.2 4.0 9.4 17.1 17.0
Mozambique 1.1 8.4 7.2 41.5 47.0 39.3
Namibia 3.5 2.5 4.8 49.2 52.7 44.7
Seychelles 4.3 7.5 6.2 24.6 42.7 8.4
South Africa 4.2 5.3 2.8 44.4 43.8 39.9
Swaziland 10.1 2.2 1.1 54.8 49.6 47.3
Tanzania 4.9 7.4 7.0 30.6 36.5 35.7
Zambia 3.6 5.2 7.6 9.4 10.5 10.5
Zimbabwe -2.7 -6.1 9.0 57.9 65.3 28.1
Source: African Development Indicators , World Bank (2011)
ECRI (%)Gross Domestic Product Growth (annual %)
Table D.2. Financial Sector Depth Indicators & ECRI Data
Country 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010
Angola 0.055 0.042 0.110 2.014 5.144 20.391 56.3 57.8 57.1
Botswana 0.066 0.061 0.092 15.118 19.139 23.404 15.2 18.9 18.1
Congo, DR ... 0.035 0.059 ... 1.872 6.572 41.3 34.1 35.7
Lesotho 0.200 0.191 0.320 16.383 9.252 14.052 41.8 44.7 42.2
Madagascar 0.153 0.120 0.144 8.777 9.879 11.707 27.0 29.4 32.3
Malawi 0.094 0.074 ... 9.076 7.913 ... 42.5 48.1 44.9
Mauritius 0.111 0.224 0.297 57.497 75.276 87.769 9.4 17.1 17.0
Mozambique 0.130 0.178 0.274 16.742 11.842 25.770 41.5 47.0 39.3
Namibia 0.212 0.174 0.270 39.785 51.806 45.637 49.2 52.7 44.7
Seychelles 0.302 0.462 0.474 22.305 32.069 28.733 24.6 42.7 8.4
South Africa 0.289 0.166 0.178 133.729 138.689 145.360 44.4 43.8 39.9
Swaziland 0.064 0.072 0.095 12.813 21.617 23.290 54.8 49.6 47.3
Tanzania 0.085 0.138 0.194 4.088 10.181 16.113 30.6 36.5 35.7
Zambia 0.077 0.099 0.158 8.551 7.721 11.504 9.4 10.5 10.5
Zimbabwe 0.185 0.385 ... 27.454 16.280 ... 57.9 65.3 28.1
* NCP/GDP = Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
  Source: Authors' calculations based on data from World Bank African Development Indicators (2010) and ECRI
ECRI (%)NCP*/GDPCIC/GDP
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 Table D.3. Correlations between Economic Freedom of the World dataset and ECRI
The Areas and Components of the EFW Index 2000 2005
Area 1: Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises 0.25 0.48
A General government consumption spending 0.16 0.22
B Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 0.13 0.06
C Government enterprises and investment -0.52 0.10
D Top marginal tax rate 0.82 0.65
i Top marginal income tax rate 0.86 0.64
ii Top marginal income and payroll tax rates 0.68 0.47
Area 2: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 0.18 0.25
     A Judicial independence (GCR) -0.42 0.25
     B Impartial courts (GCR) -0.23 0.44
     C Protection of property rights (GCR) -0.13 0.51
      D Military interference in rule of law and the political process (CRG) 0.39 0.25
      E Integrity of the legal system (CRG) 0.27 0.02
      F Legal enforcement of contracts (DB) -0.04
      G Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property (DB) 0.07
Area 3: Access to Sound Money 0.69 0.74
A Money Growth 0.45 0.56
B Standard deviation of inflation 0.52 0.55
C Inflation: Most recent year 0.46 0.37
D Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts 0.79 0.89
Area 4: Freedom to Trade Internationally 0.73 0.58
A Taxes on international trade -0.15 0.43
i. International trade tax revenues (% of trade sector) 0.08 0.44
ii Mean tariff rate -0.21 -0.01
iii Standard deviation of tariff rates -0.08 0.44
B Regulatory Trade Barriers 0.67 0.21
i Non-tariff trade barriers (GCR) 0.96 0.21
ii Compliance cost of importing and exporting (DB) -0.01 0.23
C Size of the trade sector relative to expected -0.11 -0.67
D Black-market exchange rates 0.54 0.48
E International capital market controls 0.80 0.71
i Foreign ownership/investment restrictions (GCR) 0.91 0.67
ii Capital controls 0.92 0.83
Area 5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business 0.11 0.40
A Credit market regulations 0.14 0.15
i. Ownership of banks 0.05 -0.20
ii Foreign bank competition -0.96 0.13
iii Private sector credit 0.28 0.37
iv Interest rate controls/Negative real interest rates -0.10 0.47
B Labor market regulations -0.21 0.39
i Minimum wage (DB) -0.49 0.23
ii Hiring and firing regulations (GCR) 0.62 0.49
iii Centralized collective bargaining (GCR) 0.31 0.33
iv Mandated cost of hiring (DB) -0.91 0.14
C Business Regulations 0.47 0.62
i Price controls -0.02 0.26
ii Administrative requirements (GCR) 0.23 0.53
iii Bureaucracy costs (GCR) 0.67 0.62
iv Starting a business (DB) -0.75 0.58
v Extra payments/Bribes (GCR) 0.49 -0.05
vi  Licensing restrictions (DB) 0.39
vii Cost of tax compliance (DB) 0.47
Sum of all areas 0.63 0.68
      Note: Values in italics indicate correlations formed from 5 or less common datapoints
Source: Authors' calculations. EFW data from Gwartney, Hall & Lawson (2010)
Correlation Coefficients with ECRI  
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Table D.4 records the correlation figures for the relationship between the new 
restrictiveness index and various political-economy indicators including corruption, business 
environment, political stability, government effectiveness and legal quality. The correlation 
with the corruption perception index suggests a negative relationship between corruption 
and exchange and capital restrictiveness. This implies that countries with more controls are 
also more corrupt (although not implying a causal relationship), which makes intuitive sense 
as greater levels of regulation allow more opportunities for corruption at each step of the 
bureaucratic process18. The positive correlation between ease of doing business and 
restrictiveness suggests that fewer exchange and capital controls create a more conducive 
environment for setting up and running businesses. The governance indicators all have the 
expected sign (better governance is generally associated with fewer restrictions) but fairly 
low values.  
  
2010
Corruption Perception Index -0.6
Ease of Doing Business 0.54
Voice and Accountability -0.36
Political Stability and    
Absence of Violence
-0.37
Government Effectiveness -0.33
Regulatory Quality -0.27
Rule of Law -0.33
Table D.4. Correlations between Political-
Economy Indictors & Restrictiveness Index
Source: Authors ' ca lculations  based on data  from 
Transparency International  (2011), World Bank (2011) 
and Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi  (2010). See D5-7.
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Note on Corruption Perception Index 
 
The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt their 
public sector is perceived to be. A country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of 
public sector corruption as seen by business people and country analysts on a scale of 0 - 10, 
where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is 
perceived as very clean. A country's rank indicates its position relative to the other 
countries/territories included in the index. 16 surveys and expert assessments were used 
and at least 3 were required for a country to be included in the CPI. 
 
 
 
 
Table D.5. Corruption Perception Index & Restrictiveness Index Data
Rank Country Score Country 2010 2010 Rank
168 Angola 2 Angola 57.1 15
32 Botswana 6.1 Botswana 18.1 3
168 Congo, DR 2 DRC 35.7 7
77 Lesotho 3.5 Lesotho 42.2 9
100 Madagascar 3 Madagascar 32.3 5
100 Malawi 3 Malawi 44.9 11
46 Mauritius 5.1 Mauritius 17.0 2
120 Mozambique 2.7 Mozambique 39.3 10
50 Seychelles 4.8 Seychelles 8.4 4
64 South Africa 4.1 South Africa 39.9 8
95 Swaziland 3.1 Swaziland 47.3 14
100 Tanzania 3 Tanzania 35.7 6
91 Zambia 3.2 Zambia 10.5 1
154 Zimbabwe 2.2 Zimbabwe 28.1 13
Source: Transparency International (2011)
ECRI (%)Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011
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Note on Ease of Doing Business Index 
 
The Ease of Doing Business index ranks economies from 1 to 183, with first place being best. 
A high ranking means that the regulatory environment is conducive to business operation. 
The index ranks the simple average of the country’s percentile rankings on 10 topics 
covered in the World Bank’s Doing Business. The ranking on each topic is the simple average 
of the percentile rankings on its component indicators. 
 
 
Ease of doing business index 
Country Name 2010 2010 Rank
Angola 171 57.1 15
Botswana 52 18.1 3
Congo, Dem. 
Rep.
176 35.7 7
Lesotho 142 42.2 9
Madagascar 144 32.3 5
Malawi 141 44.9 11
Mauritius 21 17.0 2
Mozambique 132 39.3 10
Namibia 74 44.7 12
Seychelles 109 8.4 4
South Africa 36 39.9 8
Swaziland 123 47.3 14
Tanzania 125 35.7 6
Zambia 80 10.5 1
Zimbabwe 168 28.1 13
(1=most business-friendly regulations)
ECRI (%)
Table D.6. Ease of Doing Business & ECRI Data
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  (2011)
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Note on Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports aggregate and individual 
governance indicators for 213 economies over the period 1996–2010, for six dimensions of 
governance: 
- Voice and Accountability 
- Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
- Government Effectiveness 
- Regulatory Quality 
- Rule of Law 
- Control of Corruption 
The aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and 
expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. The individual data 
sources underlying the aggregate indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of survey 
institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.  
Table D.7. Worldwide Governance Indicators & ECRI Data
V
o
ic
e 
&
 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
ili
ty
P
o
lic
ta
l S
ta
b
ili
ty
 -
 
N
o
 V
io
le
n
ce
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
R
eg
u
la
to
ry
 
Q
u
al
it
y
R
u
le
 o
f 
La
w
C
o
n
tr
o
l o
f 
C
o
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
A
ve
ra
ge
R
an
k
EC
R
I 2
0
1
0
R
an
k 
2
0
1
0
ANGOLA 11.3 26.8 5.2 7.6 4.2 1.4 9.4 13 57.1 15
BOTSWANA 55.7 65.3 63.3 56.7 64.2 73.3 63.1 2 18.1 3
Congo, Dem. Rep. 6.6 1.4 0.5 2.9 0.9 0.5 2.1 15 35.7 7
LESOTHO 34.4 47.4 29.0 19.0 35.4 55.7 36.8 6 42.2 9
MADAGASCAR 19.3 8.9 12.9 21.9 13.7 35.7 18.7 12 32.3 5
MALAWI 35.4 33.3 28.6 21.9 43.4 28.6 31.9 8 44.9 11
MAURITIUS 64.6 51.2 66.2 70.5 66.5 68.6 64.6 1 17.0 2
MOZAMBIQUE 37.3 42.3 26.2 28.6 28.8 31.4 32.4 7 39.3 10
NAMIBIA 54.2 57.3 47.6 48.1 55.7 57.6 53.4 3 44.7 12
SEYCHELLES 42.9 57.3 46.2 19.0 47.6 55.7 44.8 5 8.4 4
SOUTH AFRICA 58.0 32.4 56.7 54.3 51.4 54.3 51.2 4 39.9 8
SWAZILAND 8.0 28.6 19.5 18.6 27.8 37.1 23.3 10 47.3 14
TANZANIA 38.7 32.9 24.8 27.6 28.3 26.2 29.7 9 35.7 6
ZAMBIA 34.4 49.8 13.3 24.3 29.2 1.0 25.3 11 10.5 1
ZIMBABWE 5.2 6.1 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 2.3 14 28.1 13
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2010), World Bank 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 Recent academic studies on the benefits and costs of single-currency areas suggests that the adoption of a 
common currency can improve the structural characteristics of the economies concerned, increasing trade-
integration and business cycle correlation, and enhancing the credibility of macroeconomic policies (Tavlas, 
2008; Frankel & Rose, 1998; Rose, 2000). 
2
 Article 21 “lays the foundations for areas of cooperation by member states and emphasises the need for 
countries in the region to cooperate in all areas so as to advance regional development and integration” (Belle, 
2010: 85). 
3
 Article 22 “calls for the member states to conclude Protocols that will support the areas of cooperation and 
integration, and the creation of relevant institutions to implement programs of regional integration” (Belle, 
2010: 85). 
4
 The RISDP was approved in 2003 and began being effectively implemented in 2005 after the development of 
a detailed ‘operationalisation framework’ (SADC Secretariat, 2010). 
5
 Out of the 46 targets set in the RISDP implementation framework of 2005-2010 under ‘cross-cutting issues’, 
14% have been fully achieved, 68% partially achieved and 18% not achieved (SADC Secretariat, 2010). 
6
 The AREAER is a unique database published by the IMF tracking exchange and trade arrangements for all 187 
member countries since 1950 (IMF, 2010). Individual country chapters report exchange measures in place, the 
structure and setting of the exchange rate, arrangements for payments and receipts, procedures for resident 
and nonresident accounts, mechanisms for import and export payments and receipts, controls on capital 
transactions, and provisions specific to the financial sector (IMF, 2010). 
7
 Individual country chapters report exchange measures in place, the structure and setting of the exchange 
rate, arrangements for payments and receipts, procedures for resident and nonresident accounts, mechanisms 
for import and export payments and receipts, controls on capital transactions, and provisions specific to the 
financial sector (IMF, 2010). 
8
 Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sløk’s 2002 paper on capital account liberalisation provides a thorough discussion of 
each of the (and some additional) measures. 
9
 Capital account liberalisation is viewed as a pathway to achieving greater financial depth and integration 
internationally, which is expected to lead to higher growth. Empirical studies use both capital account 
liberalisation and financial integration as the independent variables in studies relating to growth. 
10
 GDP per capita below US$ 3 000 
11
 GDP per capita above US$ 5 000 
12
 1 indicates capital account restrictions exist and 0 indicates no restrictions. 
13
 Until 1995, the AREAER was presented using binary dummy variables to indicate restrictiveness (Schindler, 
2008: 224). Since 1995 however, the AREAER provides more in-depth information on openness to capital flows 
and contains summary tables with details on the restrictions in place for all IMF member countries. The new 
index utilises this more structured and comprehensive approach. 
14
 Goods, Services, Capital Account, Financial Sector Only and Restrictions Applying to All. 
15
 For example, in 2000 Lesotho had only reported information for 55 out of the 75 restrictions selected for 
coding giving it a total restrictiveness score of 41.8% in the new index. If the missing 20 line items were, in 
reality, unrestricted and had been reported and captured in the AREAER, the score would have been 30.6%. On 
the other hand if each of those line items were actually maximally restricted, the score should have been 
56.5%. This gives an approximate margin of error or 26%. When removing missing information from the count 
this error is averaged but the potential for bias is still high, especially in restrictive countries that under-report. 
16
 The correlation for 2005 excludes Angola, which is a significant outlier with a spike in GDP growth rate from 
average values of 3% per annum to 20% in 2005; dropping back down to 2-3% in the following years. 
17
 South Africa has a substantially developed financial sector but is still fairly restrictive and Zambia has a very 
underdeveloped financial sector but is pursuing its development through the liberalisation of exchange 
controls (Odhiambo, 2009). 
18
 Essentially using corruption as a proxy for bureaucracy. 
